Big Tobacco and Hollywood: Kicking the Habit of Product Placement and On-Screen Smoking by Fuchs, Matthew S.
Journal of Health Care Law and Policy
Volume 8 | Issue 2 Article 8
Big Tobacco and Hollywood: Kicking the Habit of
Product Placement and On-Screen Smoking
Matthew S. Fuchs
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jhclp
Part of the Health Law Commons, and the Substance Abuse and Addiction Commons
This Notes & Comments is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
of Health Care Law and Policy by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Matthew S. Fuchs, Big Tobacco and Hollywood: Kicking the Habit of Product Placement and On-Screen Smoking, 8 J. Health Care L. &
Pol'y 343 (2005).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jhclp/vol8/iss2/8
COMMENTS
BIG TOBACCO AND HOLLYWOOD: KICKING THE HABIT OF
PRODUCT PLACEMENT AND ON-SCREEN SMOKING
BY MATTHEW S. FUCHS.
"[F]ilm is better than any commercial that has been run on television or
any magazine, because the audience is totally unaware of any sponsor
involvement...
"Man is by nature an imitative animal."2
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1964, the Surgeon General's Advisory Committee on Smoking and
Health concluded that cigarette smoking is a significant health hazard.3 The
Committee recommended "remedial action."4 However, by all accounts, tobacco
use today remains the most deadly of the preventable causes of illnesses in this
country.5 Statistics indicate that more than twelve million Americans have died
" Matthew S. Fuchs received his B.S. from Johns Hopkins University in 2001 and his J.D. from the
University of Maryland School of Law in 2005. He would like to thank Professor Kathleen Dachille for
her insights and encouragement.
1. C. Mekemson & S.A. Glantz, How the Tobacco Industry Built its Relationship with
Hollywood, 11 Tobacco Control i81, i82 (2002) (emphasis in original) (quoting Robert Richards,
president of Productions Inc., a movie and television production company, in a letter dated August 25,
1972, to William Smith, president ofR.J. Reynolds), http://tc.bmjjoumals.com/cgi/reprint/l I /suppl_
l/i81.pdf(last visited July 5, 2005).
2. HENRY JAMES FOREMAN, OUR MOVIES MADE CHILDREN 147 (1933).
3. See MARTHA A. DERTHICK, UP IN SMOKE 10 (2002) (discussing the results of the 1964 report
of the U.S. Surgeon General's Advisory Committee on Smoking and Health); RICHARD KLUGER,
ASHES TO ASHES: AMERICA'S HUNDRED-YEAR CIGARETTE WAR, THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE
UNABASHED TRIUMPH OF PHILIP MORRIS 242-62 (1996).
4. DERTHICK supra note 3 at 11.
5. See, e.g., Peter H. Rheinstein et al., Children and Tobacco: The FDA's Final Rule, 55 AM.
FAM. PHYSICIAN 1441, 1442 (1997) (discussing that the number of deaths from tobacco use are more
"than the combined total of deaths from acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, vehicular accidents,
alcohol, homicides, illegal drugs, suicides and fires, all of which are considered preventable causes of
premature death"); THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL,
EXEC. SUMM., NAT'L CTR. FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION AND HEALTH PROMOTION 7, 14 (2004)
[hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL 2004], http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/sgr/sgr_2004/pdf/executive
summary.pdf(last visited July 5, 2005).
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from smoking since 1967.6 Currently, smoking alone kills an estimated 440,000
Americans each year.7 Furthermore, the economic toll for treating smoking-related
diseases and conditions exceeds $157 billion each year - $75 billion in direct
medical costs and $82 billion in lost productivity. 8
The smoking epidemic persists in part because smoking rates among
teenagers remain high. 9 In 2003, 24.4% of high school seniors smoked regularly.' 0
Moreover, according to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, more
than 53% of all adult smokers became addicted before age eighteen, and 82% tried
their first cigarette before age eighteen." In an attempt to reduce teen smoking,
researchers have tried to determine which influences most impact adolescent
decisions to use tobacco. As expected, researchers have found that behaviors and
attitudes of family and friends are major influences.12
However, researchers have also discovered that watching Hollywood actors
light up in movies significantly affects adolescent smoking behavior. The most
convincing studies have been conducted by Madeline Dalton of Dartmouth
University. 13 After controlling for all other factors known to influence smoking,
Dr. Dalton found a three-fold increase in smoking initiation among children ages
10-14 who viewed the greatest number of smoking depictions in movies.
14
Accordingly, her studies suggest that a decline in youth exposure to smoking in
movies could significantly reduce teen smoking."
Projected nationally, the study's results mean that youth-rated movies
showing tobacco use now recruit 360,000 new adolescent smokers annually -
roughly half of all new smokers.' 6  Of the adolescents recruited to smoke by
Hollywood each year, many will eventually die from tobacco-related diseases.
17
6. The Low-Tar Myth, CBSNEwS.COM (Feb. 20, 2001).
7. SURGEON GENERAL 2004, supra note 5.
8. Id. at 13.
9. See id at 14 (noting that the rate of decline among youth smokers is "slowing appreciably").
10. Id.
11. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (CDC), HEALTHY PEOPLE 2010, TOBACCO
USE, 27-4 (Nov. 2000), http://www.healthypeople.gov/Document/pdfNolume2/27Tobacco.pdf (last
visited July 5, 2005).
12. See Erica H. van Roosmalen & Susan A. McDaniel, Peer Group Influence as a Factor in
Smoking Behavior of Adolescents, 24 ADOLESCENCE 801, 802 (1989) (citing more than a dozen past
studies to support the statement that "[plrevious research on smoking behavior of adolescents
acknowledges this strong correlation between smoking and peer pressure").
13. See generally, Madeline A. Dalton et al., Effect of Viewing Smoking in Movies on Adolescent
Smoking Initiation: A Cohort Study, 362 THE LANCET 281, 281-85 (2003). This 2003 research is the
first longitudinal study of the correlation between watching movie smoking, and adolescent smoking.
Previous cross-sectional and experimental studies failed to establish a temporal relation. Id. at 281.
14. Id. at 284.
15. Id.
16. Christopher Heredia, UCSF Study Ignites Drive to Stop Smoking in Kids" Movies, SAN FRAN.
CHRON., April 2, 2004, at F-1, http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2004/04/02/
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Long suspecting that smoking in movies had this influence on teens,18
public officials took steps in the 1990s to limit cigarette appearances on screen.
For example, officials pressured Big Tobacco 19 into a series of restrictions on paid
product placements.2 ° Paid product placement occurs when a tobacco company
pays a Hollywood studio, in some cases rather handsomely, 2 1 to use the company's
tobacco products in a film. 22 In light of restrictions on paid product placement, one
would expect big screen smoking scenes to be on the decline.
Nevertheless, the past few years have witnessed anything but such a
decline. Although smoking in movies dropped from 10.7 incidents per hour in
1950 to 4.9 in 1980-1982, this downward trend actually reversed itself in the
1990s. 2 3 Indeed, in 2002 the rate had increased to 10.9 incidents per hour.24 Even
more disturbingly, these smoking scenes commonly occur in movies targeting
teenagers. A University of California study found that 80% of PG-13 rated movies
produced from 1998-2002 included smoking. 25 G-rated movies included smoking
approximately 50% of the time.26 Adding to the problem is that teens see movies
more often than any other age group,27 and thus they are bombarded most heavily
WBGVN5TBP5 .DTL (last visited July 5, 2005).
17. SURGEON GENERAL 2004, supra note 5.
18. Long before Dalton's studies, researchers established that social behavior is controlled to a
great extent by "strategies" or "scripts" that people store in memory and use as behavioral guides when
they confront particular situations. See, e.g., Brandon S. Centerwall, Television and Violence: The
Scale of the Problem and Where to Go From Here, 267 JAMA 3059, 3060 (1992).
19. For the purposes of this paper, "Big Tobacco" refers to the top U.S. tobacco firms: Phillip
Morris, Brown & Williamson, Lorillard, R.J. Reynolds, and British American Tobacco.
20. For example, through congressional and FTC pressure, the government pressured Big Tobacco
into agreeing to a voluntary ban on all paid product placement in movies. See infra note 35 and
accompanying text. In 1998, the attorneys general included in its Master Settlement Agreement (MSA)
a provision banning product placement. See infra notes 38-47 and accompanying text (discussing the
MSA in detail).
21. See, e.g., Siva K. Balasubramanian, Beyond Advertising and Publicity: Hybrid Messages and
Public Policy Issues, 23 J. ADVERTISING, 29, 33 (1994) (noting that product placement has grown into a
multi-million dollar business with placement packages costing upwards of $500,000 per movie).
22. Steven L. Snyder, Movies and Product Placement: Is Hollywood Turning Films into
Commercial Speech?, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 301, 301 (1992).
23. Stanton A. Glantz, et al., Back to the Future: Smoking in Movies in 2002 Compared with 1950s
Levels, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 261, 261-62 (2004) (discussing a study which concluded that smoking
in movies during the 1990s returned to levels observed in 1950).
24. Id. at 262.
25. Heredia, supra note 16 (citing the UC San Francisco study).
26. Id.
27. PIERRE BOUVARD ET AL., ARBITRON, THE ARBITRON CINEMA ADVERTISING STUDY 11 (2003)
[hereinafter ARBITRON CINEMA], http://www.natoonline.org/Cinema%20Advertising%2OStudy.pdf
(last visited July 5, 2005).
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by tobacco scenes.28 Perhaps as a result, teens recall and recognize tobacco
products featured in movies at a far greater rate than other age demographics.
29
The increase in big screen smoking makes it likely that teen smoking will
persist. Furthermore, it suggests the possibility that Big Tobacco product
placement continues, though no one is sure. In fact, commentators are left with a
mystery saga, perhaps fit for the silver screen. The Justice Department (DOJ) and
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) are the gritty, no-nonsense detectives. Both the
DOJ and FTC have expressed an interest in investigating the suspected villains,
Hollywood and Big Tobacco, to determine who is responsible for continued on-
screen smoking.
This Comment does not solve this mystery, but in Section II, I examine
steps that the DOJ and FTC should take to find out if Big Tobacco product
placement persists. Then, in Section III, this Comment considers the feasibility of
a solution that does not require the involvement of Big Tobacco. Rather, I look at
possible strategies for convincing and, if necessary, forcing Hollywood to take
action to neutralize the effect of smoking in movies. Finally, this article concludes
that the best strategy is to pressure Hollywood to show antismoking Public Service
Announcements (PSAs). Theaters would show these PSAs prior to movies
involving smoking.
SECTION II: CLOSE SCRUTINY OF BIG TOBACCO
Big Tobacco has a long history of deceiving public health advocates, state
officials, consumers, and the general public. This history of deception, combined
with the fact that movie screen smoking persists, demands close scrutiny of Big
Tobacco's claims of discontinued paid product placement. Accordingly, the DOJ
and FTC should seriously consider investigating whether paid product placement
indeed continues.
28. See JONATHON R. POLANSKY & STANTON A. GLANTZ, CTR. FOR TOBACCO CONTROL
RESEARCH AND EDUC., UNIV. OF CAL., SAN FRAN., FIRST-RUN SMOKING PRESENTATIONS IN U.S.
MOVIES 1999-2003, 9-10 (2004) (finding that adolescents see incidents of smoking in movie theaters 75
percent more than younger children and 20 percent more than young adults),
http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1 047&context-ctcre (last visited July 5, 2005).
29. See AsSOC.'D FILM PROMOTIONS, RECALL AND RECOGNITION OF COMMERCIAL PRODUCTS IN
MOTION PICTURES (Sept. 1 1981) (recall and recognition study performed by Associated Film
Promotions for Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company, which compared the ability to recall and
recognized different products among different age groups and found persons under 18 recall and
recognize tobacco products more frequently than those aged 18-35 and 56 and over),
http://legacy.library.ucsfedu/cgi/getdoctid=hgo3OfO&fmt--pdf&ref-results (last visited July 5, 2005).
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A. Big Tobacco's History of Deception Has Continued, Despite Laws and
Agreements that Forbid Big Tobacco Product Placement.
Perhaps more than any other American industry, Big Tobacco's word is
tainted by a tradition of covert action. This tradition has been evident in the realms
of science, politics, and elsewhere. 30 For example, Big Tobacco claimed for years
that active and passive smoking did not cause disease, despite internal documents
showing this claim to be a farce. 31 Big Tobacco has also been excoriated for
refusing to acknowledge the addictive nature of nicotine despite company records
to the contrary, and notwithstanding the industry's adjustments of nicotine to
optimize nicotine delivery to smokers.32
This tradition of artifice is also evident in Big Tobacco's relationship with
Hollywood. Indeed, evidence abounds that Big Tobacco continued product
placements in movies, even after the passage of laws and agreements that
condemned this practice. For instance, in 1989 the Subcommittee on
Transportation and Hazardous Materials of the U.S. House Committee on Energy
and Commerce waged an investigation of Big Tobacco's practice of product
placements.33 This investigation, spearheaded by Ohio Representative Thomas
Luken, created a public outcry against tobacco product placement. 34 To mitigate
the developing public relations nightmare, in 1990 the Tobacco Institute
announced a voluntary ban on all paid product placement in movies.
35
After this voluntary ban, in the 1990s the industry stopped mentioning
product placement in internal documents. However, some circumstantial evidence
survived this era of increased secrecy to indicate that, incredibly, Big Tobacco's
practice of product placement persevered. In a 1998 study, interviews of
Hollywood directors, writers, actors, studio executives, and others indicated that
they "thought [product placement] occurred," although none claimed to know of
30. Mekemson & Glantz, supra note I at i89.
31. See DERTHICK, supra note 3 at 35-41 (describing how, throughout the 1970s, Big Tobacco
lawyers suppressed evidence produced by company scientists proving that smoking was hazardous).
32. See Alix M. Freedman & Suein L. Hwang, Three Ex-Employees Say Phillip Morris
Deliberately Controlled Nicotine Levels, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 1996, at BI (citing three ex-Phillip
Morris executives as saying that Phillip Morris "not only believes it is in the nicotine-delivery business,
but deliberately controls nicotine levels in its cigarette brands").
33. TOBACCO INSTITUTE, PUBLIC AFFAIRS MANAGEMENT PROGRESS AND EXPENSE REPORT FOR
SEPT., 1989 16 (detailing hearings on the "Protect Our Children from Cigarette Advertising Act of
1989," H.R. 1250, 101st Cong., 1989), http://tobaccodocuments.org/blileyti/20126.html?start page= I
(last visited July 5, 2005).
34. Id.
35. See Robert Adler, Here's Smoking at You Kid: Has Tobacco Product Placement in Movies
Really Stopped?, 60 MONT. L. REV. 243, 255 (1999) (citing Press Release, The Tobacco Institute,
Major New Initiatives To Discourage Youth Smoking Announced, (Dec. 11 1990),
http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/calminnesota/htmU3930/001/otherpages/allpages.htmi (last visited
July 5, 2005), which announced the voluntary ban, while at the same time insisting that "cigarette
advertising has no significant effect on the prevalence of smoking by young people").
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any specific placements.36 In addition, as noted earlier, the substantial increase in
the appearance of cigarette brand names in movies throughout the 1990s comprised
further evidence that product placement continued.37
Reacting to this circumstantial evidence, the states' attorneys general
sought to legally reinforce the 1990 voluntary ban.38 To do so, they included in the
1998 Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) with Big Tobacco the following
language in Section III:
No Participating Manufacturer may ... make or cause to be made, any
payment or other consideration to any other person or entity to use,
display, make reference to or use as a prop any Tobacco Product,
Tobacco Product package, advertisement for a Tobacco Product, or any
other item baring a Brand Name in any motion picture ....
Accordingly, the MSA provides an enforcement mechanism for a wide range of
product placement activity. For instance, Section III of the MSA condemns
product placement whether it occurs by cash payments or simply by making
tobacco products available.4 ° Section III is critical in this respect because,
according to industry insiders, Hollywood generally has not paid money for
tobacco product placements since the 1990 voluntary ban. 41 Rather, Big Tobacco
36. David L. Shields et al., Hollywood on Tobacco: How the Entertainment Industry Understands
Tobacco Portrayal, 8 TOBACCO CONTROL 378, 379-80 (1999) (discussing a study in which the
interviewees were "drawn from the California-based entertainment industry"), http://tc.bmjjournals.com
/cgi/reprint/8/4/378 (last visited July 5, 2005). See also ACTION ON SMOKING AND HEALTH (ASH),
EVERYTHING FOR EVERYBODY CONCERNED ABOUT SMOKING AND NONSMOKERS' RIGHTS, (May 12,
1998) [hereinafter ASH Report] (discussing evidence that product placement by the tobacco industry
continued long after its supposed demise in 1990), at http://no-smoking.org/may98/05-12-98-1.htm
(last visited July 5, 2005).
37. See, e.g., James D. Sargent et al., Brand Appearances in Contemporary Cinema Films and
Contribution to Global Marketing of Cigarettes, 357 LANCET 29, 29-31 (2001) (noting brand exposure
through actor use increased from 1% before the industry's voluntary restriction on product placement to
11% afterward).
38. Mekemson & Glantz, supra note I at i89.
39. NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, MULTISTATE SETTLEMENT WITH THE TOBACCO
INDUSTRY, MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 15 (1998) [hereinafter, MSA], http://www.library.ucsf.
edu/tobacco/litigation/msa.pdf (last visited July 5, 2005)
40. E-mail from Marlene Trestman, Special Assistant to the Attorney General of Maryland, to
Matthew Fuchs (Dec. 9, 2004, 12:04:21 EST) (on file with Journal of Health Care Law & Policy). "[I]f
anyone has evidence that a participating manufacturer (i.e., a signatory to the MSA) has given
cigarettes, or anything else of value (food, apartment, car, movie equipment, S$) to anyone involved in
the making of a movie (propmaster, actor, director, crew) or has caused them to be given to anyone in
the making of a movie such as by hiring an intermediary, the MSA offers an enforcement mechanism."
Id.
41. Adler, supra note 35, at 266 (citing Telephone interview with Dean Ayers, President of
Entertainment Resources Marketing Association (the product placement industry's trade association)
(Apr. 27, 1998) (stating that 80-90 percent of product placement in movies is unpaid)).
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usually gives Hollywood free samples of the product in return for placements in
films. 42 Pursuant to Section III, these samples are forbidden.
Moreover, Section III states that Big Tobacco may not "cause [product
placement] to be made. ' 43 Thus, Big Tobacco has agreed not to use any third party
intermediary to make product placements. 44 This aspect is important because Big
Tobacco has a history of using intermediaries to further pro-tobacco agendas. For
instance, it directed third parties to generate controversy about evidence that active
and passive smoking cause disease,45 and to organize opposition to tobacco control
measures. 4 6 Through Section III, the attorneys general squarely addressed Big
Tobacco's propensity to use intermediaries to promote tobacco use in films.
In fact, the attorneys general have interpreted the text of Section III even
more broadly. Beyond prohibiting the use of third parties, the attorneys general
have argued that Section III requires Big Tobacco to take any "commercially
reasonable" step to prevent the unauthorized use of brands in films. 4 7 Thus, even if
Big Tobacco has no relation to the third party, it has an affirmative obligation to
police the use of the brand-name.48
Due to the breadth of Section 1II, one would expect the MSA to deter Big
Tobacco from engaging in product placement. In fact, discovery of the continued
practice will result in significant civil penalties. 49  Nevertheless, since the
Agreement's inception, the on-screen appearance of tobacco products in movies
has only increased.5 °
B. Recommendation: Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission
Investigation, and MSA Section III Enforcement
The history of covert action and the mysterious increase in tobacco
appearances in movies warrant DOJ and FTC investigation to determine if Big
Tobacco is complying with applicable laws and agreements. If the DOJ and FTC
42. Id.
43. MSA, supra note 39, § 111(e).
44. E-mail from Marlene Trestman, supra note 40.
45. STANTON A. GLANTZ ET AL., THE CIGARETTE PAPERS 40-44 (1996).
46. See J. Mark Ahem, Press Query, Brown & Williamson, July 22, 1983, http://legacy.library.
ucsf.edu/cgi/getdoc?tid=vfhl3f0&fmt=pdf&ref-results (last visited July 5, 2005) (documenting
Brown & Williamsons's use of the press as an intermediary to deflect assertions that it had violated
rules governing tobacco advertisements in G-rated films).
47. Vanessa O'Connell, Tobacco Makers Want Cigarettes Cut From Films, WALL ST. J., June 14,
2004, at B, available at 2004 WLNR 7324583. State authorities in California have recently informed
Big Tobacco that it is obliged under the MSA to police any use of its brands in films. Id. Indeed, in
early 2004, at the urging of California's attorney general, R.J. Reynolds asked Sony Pictures to edit its
products out of the movie "Mona Lisa Smile." Id.
48. Id.
49. See MSA, supra note 39, § VII, Enforcement.
50. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
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discover that product placement is indeed ongoing, Section III of the MSA requires
an injunction and substantial civil penalties. However, as explained in section C of
this Comment, even if DOJ and FTC action triggers the end of product placement,
the problem of smoking in movies might continue. Therefore, this section will
explore strategies to pressure Hollywood to reduce the impact of smoking in
movies.
1. DOJ and FTC Investigation
According to Action on Smoking and Health (ASH), an anti-smoking non-
governmental organization, in 1997 the Justice Department agreed to "thoroughly
review" whether the increase in tobacco product appearances was caused by
product placement. 51 However, as of publication of this article, the results of this
investigation, if it has even occurred, are unknown.
What makes the DOJ's inaction particularly frustrating is how little energy
is required for the DOJ to get the ball rolling. In fact, the DOJ could simply write
letters to the major tobacco companies and Hollywood studios, asking them to
respond in writing, and under the penalties for lying in an official investigation,
whether they or any of their agents coordinated or know of tobacco product
placements. 52 Responses to these simple letters could then be reviewed to establish
if any further inquiries are appropriate.
5 3
The FTC has been comparatively active in investigating product
placement. It requires Big Tobacco to file annual "special reports" on sales and
advertising expenditures, including product placements in movies.54 Specifically,
the FTC requires Big Tobacco to reveal all payments or other consideration
supplied to those engaged in product placement.
55
Although promising, these requirements need buttressing. The FTC's
annual investigative orders include language that is too vague, thus permitting Big
Tobacco to interpret the orders narrowly. For instance, the FTC only asks Big
Tobacco about payments or other consideration to those "engaged in the business
of product placement., 56 Big Tobacco can interpret these murky orders to require
only responses concerning firms that specialize in product placement. Other third
parties used by Big Tobacco to place products, such as public relations companies,
51. ASH, Justice to Investigate "Hidden Cigarette Ads" in Movies, at http://ash.org/investigation
.html (last visited July 5, 2005).
52. ASH report, supra note 36.
53. Id.
54. See Adler, supra note 35 at 266-67 (referencing Federal Trade Commission, Order to File
Special Report, July 28, 1995 (copy on file with author)) (discussing the 1995 order expanding the
questions to be asked of tobacco companies).
55. See id. at n.131 (providing two sample questions from the FTC 1995 order).
56. Id. at 267.
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may not be viewed as "in the business" of placement. As a result, the FTC's
orders do not scrutinize all use of third party product placement by Big Tobacco.
The FTC must iron out these ambiguities; it should specify that the FTC
orders seek information about all third parties, not just those that specialize in
product placement. Such orders make sense considering that use of all third parties
is prohibited by the MSA. In fact, the FTC should interrogate Big Tobacco about
all activities that would violate the MSA, as well as actions that Big Tobacco is
required to take to prevent MSA infractions. Likewise, it would be insufficient for
the DOJ only to attempt to locate direct cash payments by Big Tobacco; the DOJ
must also investigate free samples and placement that occurs via third parties.
2. MSA Section III Enforcement
If the FTC and the DOJ discover that product placement is indeed ongoing,
any settling state could bring an action against Big Tobacco in that state's court for
violating the MSA.57 If the court finds that a good-faith dispute exists as to the
meaning of the terms of the Agreement, the court might enter a declaratory order,
58
or a declaration construing terms in the Agreement.
59
The court will find no good-faith dispute over the meaning of the MSA
Section III provision if the government uncovers evidence that Big Tobacco has
placed products directly, without using a third party. In that case, violation of the
MSA's terms is unmistakable. In other contexts, though, courts might find a good-
faith dispute. For example, the FTC or DOJ might discover that Big Tobacco
failed to discourage a third party from placing products. As mentioned, the
attorneys general have interpreted Section III to require Big Tobacco to take all
commercially reasonable steps to stop third party placement, even when Big
Tobacco did not request the third party to place their tobacco products. However,
the text of the provision is ambiguous on this point. Consequently, it is
questionable whether a state judge would grant an injunction.
On the other hand, Big Tobacco recently has taken steps to prevent
Hollywood from using brand-name products, 60 suggesting that even Big Tobacco
considers Section III to compel policing the use of tobacco products. 61 If the court
determines that Big Tobacco has indeed breached the MSA, the state may request
57. See MSA, supra note 39, § VII. The state could only bring such an action in a court to which
the Agreement was "presented for approval and/or entry as to that Settling State." Id. § 11(p).
58. Id. § VII(c)(5).
59. Id. § VII(c)(1).
60. See supra note 47.
61. However, R.J. Reynolds's motivation for asking Sony Pictures to edit its products out of
"Mona Lisa Smile" is unknown. Rather than representing a concession that Section III requires Big
Tobacco to police all use of brand-names in movies, RJR's request might simply have been a public
relations ploy.
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an injunction.62 As discussed above, the court also might impose substantial civil
penalties on the manufacturer.
63
C. Eradicating Product Placement Does Not Necessarily Solve the Problem of
Smoking in Movies.
The DOJ and FTC should adequately investigate the possibility of
continued product placement by Big Tobacco, and if violations are revealed, states
should bring claims under the MSA. However, as suggested by the above analysis,
such investigation and subsequent state claims do not necessarily solve the
problem of smoking in movies. For example, even if the DOJ and FTC discover
that Big Tobacco product placement continues, and consequent government action
prevents Big Tobacco from continuing to place products, problems still might
persist. Such action only prevents Big Tobacco companies from placing products
bearing their brand-names. 64 This solution would be insufficient because most on-
screen tobacco appearances are "generic," or lacking a brand-name.65 Just like
watching actors use brand-name products, watching on-screen use of generic
tobacco products stimulates greater interest in cigarettes.
66
Moreover, even if MSA enforcement ends Big Tobacco product placement,
nothing impedes Hollywood's continued use of brand-name tobacco, independent
of Big Tobacco involvement. Similarly, even if the FTC and the DOJ
investigation uncovers no foul play by Big Tobacco, tobacco scenes might
continue, thus forcing the conclusion that Hollywood is the true villain behind
67smoking in movies. In fact, regardless of Big Tobacco involvement, Hollywood
ultimately controls movie content. Consequently, consumer and governmental
health advocates must pressure Hollywood to rethink policies on smoking in
movies. The next section focuses on strategies that bypass Big Tobacco altogether,
instead directly pressuring Hollywood to lower the rate of on-screen smoking.
62. MSA, supra note 39, § VII(c)(4).
63. Adler, supra note 35, at 265 ("if the tobacco industry violates the terms of the agreement, the
defendants presumably face substantial civil penalties"). See also MSA, supra note 39, § 11(n)
(defining "claims" to include civil penalties).
64. The MSA, for example, does not cover product placement for generic smoking. See Adler,
supra note 35, at 267-68.
65. See O'Connell, supra note 47 (noting that of movies released from 1999 to 2003 that included
tobacco scenes, most was generic).
66. See id. See also Theresa F. Stockwell & Stanton A. Glantz, Tobacco Use is Increasing in
Popular Films, 6 TOBACCO CONTROL 282 (1997). These authors note that, through perhaps the
Tobacco Institute, Big Tobacco might pay Hollywood even just to use generic tobacco products.
Although generic smoking would not favor one brand over another, if it stimulated greater interest in
smoking, it would trigger increased sales for the entire industry. Id.
67. In fact, the DOJ and FTC investigations of product placement should focus not only on Big
Tobacco, but also Hollywood. This point is explored in more detail at the end of Section Ill(A) of this
Comment.
[VOL. 8:2:343
BIG TOBACCO AND HOLLYWOOD
SECTION III: STRATEGIES TO PRESSURE HOLLYWOOD TO REDUCE THE IMPACT OF
SMOKING IN MOVIES, WITHOUT INVOLVING BIG TOBACCO
Smoking first became prevalent on American movie screens in the 1950s.
68
At this time, Hollywood was prohibited by moral and governmental regulations
from showing sex scenes. 69 As a result, directors searched for a substitute for
sexual gratuity which could appeal to viewer's prurient interests, but could do so in
an indirect and socially acceptable way.70 In cigarette smoking, they found their
answer.71 Smoking communicated a sexual energy between two actors, a tangible
force that gripped and enticed audiences.72 But Hollywood soon discovered that
this was just the tip of the iceberg. Smoking also portrayed to audiences a sense of
sophistication and rebellion, two qualities particularly attractive to Hollywood's
most cherished demographic: teenagers.73 In fact, Hollywood's desire to continue
attracting teenagers is the primary reason that, today, Hollywood is reluctant to
take steps to mitigate the impact of on-screen smoking.
In recent years, three different groups have signaled an interest in
institutionalizing measures to remedy the impact of smoking in movies. First,
government leaders have applied pressure on Hollywood, and even have suggested
that if Hollywood does not act, Congress would usurp Hollywood's control over
editing content. Second, consumer groups have indicated their desire for an end to
smoking in movies; these groups have the most potential to curtail smoking in
movies. In fact, consumer groups have a series of viable causes of action against
Hollywood. For example, consumers can bring an Article 78 suit asserting that the
Motion Pictures Association of America (MPAA),74 Hollywood's rating body,
rates on an arbitrary and capricious basis. Pursuant to such an action, consumers
should demand that the MPAA improve its rating system by applying an R rating
to all movies with smoking scenes. Another viable action is a tort suit. In
addition, groups have at their disposal the shareholder's resolution against
Hollywood studios. The tort suit and shareholder resolution can be used either to
compel Hollywood to apply an R rating, or to show Public Service
Announcements (PSAs). These PSAs would propound anti-smoking messages,
68. See Chris Hastings, Hollywood Faces Fury as Smoking on Screen Returns to 1950s Levels,
TELEGRAPH (London), July 3, 2004; see also Smoking Becoming Part of Hollywood Nostalgia, CHI.
TRIB., June 22, 1997, available at 1997 WL 3561134.
69. Smoking Becoming Part of Hollywood Nostalgia, supra note 68.
70. See Hastings, supra note 68.
71. See id. ("Many stars of the 1940s and 1950s regarded the cigarette as adding to their sexual
allure.").
72. See id.
73. Id. Adolescents comprise Hollywood's most cherished demographic because, as noted earlier,
they see more movies than any other age demographic. See ARBITRON CINEMA, supra note 27.
74. The Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) is a not-for-profit corporation and its
members are producers and distributors of motion pictures and television programs. Miramax Films
Corp. v. MPAA, Inc. 560 N.Y.S.2d 730, 732 (1990).
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and would be shown prior to the screening of movies with tobacco scenes. This
paper takes the position that both methods would be effective, but PSAs are more
effective and feasible and therefore the better remedy.
Finally, Hollywood itself has expressed an interest in reducing on-screen
smoking. On the other hand, Hollywood has long resisted efforts to change the
MPAA rating system or to compel PSAs.75 MPAA President Jack Valenti has
76
served as Hollywood's mouthpiece in enunciating this resistance. Again,
because they are more effective and feasible than an alteration of the rating system,
PSAs are the more effective strategy to circumvent Hollywood resistance.
A. Government Leaders
Over the past year, Senators from both U.S. political parties and attorneys
general from twenty-seven states have insisted that Hollywood do something to
prevent children from becoming tobacco-addicted adults. 77 These health-minded
officials have met with studio heads, the Director's Guild of America (DGA), the
MPAA, and others.78 Most recently, in May, 2004, the Senate Commerce
Committee held a hearing to discuss the problem with the MPAA, among others.79
At this hearing, Senator John Ensign stated that he prefers voluntary efforts over
legislation.80 However, Senator Ensign sounded a warning to Hollywood: if it
does not pursue voluntary efforts, the U.S. Congress will act.
8 1
Unfortunately, Congress and the attorneys general have little legal pull to
affect the content of Hollywood films. In fact, the government's recent pressure
bears striking resemblance to two key moments in the history of attempted
Hollywood censorship. Both moments demonstrate the government's relative
impotence to force Hollywood to alter the content of films. In fact, throughout the
75. James Bates & Amy Wallace, Pressure's on Again to Edit Film Rating System, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 27, 2000, at Al.
76. Id.
77. David McAlary, U.S. Lawmakers Warn Hollywood to Reduce Smoking in Movies,
VOANEWS.COM, May 13, 2004, http://voanews.com/english/Archive/a-2004-05-13-15-
I.cfm?textmode=0 (last visited July 5, 2005).
78. See, e.g., Ted Elrick, Smoking in the Movies: The DGA Responds to the Controversy, DGA
MAGAZINE (July 2004) [hereinafter DGA Responds] (noting that in December, 2003, DGA met with
Senators John Ensign (D-NV) and the attorneys general of Maryland, Connecticut, Utah and Vermont
and representatives from the attorney general offices of California and Maine),
http://www.dga.org/news/v29_2/craft-smkg_704.php3 (last visited July 5, 2005); Press Release,
Maryland Attorney General, Curran to Testify to Senate on Impact of Smoking in Movies on Children,
(May 10, 2004) [hereinafter Curran Media Release] (writing that AG Curran has met with Valenti, the
National Association of Theaters (NATO), and production executives from seven major studios),
http://www.oag.state.md.us/Press/2004/051004.htm (last visited July 5, 2005).
79. See McAlary, supra note 77.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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twentieth century, the government's role in creating change in Hollywood has
taken a backseat to the more effective role played by consumer advocates.
The first example of attempted censorship is the government's effort to
influence content in the late 1920s and early 1930s. In 1927, the Hays Office
issued the Hays Code: "Don'ts and Be Carefuls. 82 Designed to quiet frequent
complaints about movie-content, the Hays Code included eleven forbidden
subjects and twenty-five topics on which producers were required to exercise
caution.83 Despite the Code, at the onset of the Depression, movie producers still
operated under lax, voluntary self-regulation. 84 Then, in 1933, the U.S. Senate
initiated an investigation of the movie industry.85 Although Hollywood stated its
interest in upholding the Code, it once again stymied government requests by
refusing to make these standards mandatory.86 Hollywood's behavior reflected its
sense that Congress was powerless to enforce significant content restrictions.
However, the Code was ultimately enforced, not because of the Senate, but
because consumers dictated change. Where Senate intervention failed, the
organization of a boycott by the Catholic Church succeeded.87 In October, 1933,
pursuant to the direction of a papal emissary in New York,88 an estimated eight
million Catholics signed a pledge to boycott any films declared objectionable by
the church hierarchy.
89
The boycott never happened. Instead, the industry immediately
capitulated, adopting a new system whereby films required a certificate of approval
prior to release.90 Moreover, rather than face the boycott, Hollywood agreed to
give the Hays Office a significant role in reviewing films prior to release. 9' On the
local level, a slew of state and municipal legislatures passed laws that regulated
movies even more strictly than the Hays Code.92 This example demonstrates that
82. RUTH A. INGLIS, FREEDOM OF THE MOVIES: A REPORT ON SELF-REGULATION FROM THE
COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 114-16 (1947). Will Hays was president of the Motion
Picture Producers and Distributors of America, the predecessor of the MPAA. Id. at 113.
83. Id. For instance, open mouth kissing was prohibited; a man and woman in bed, whether
married or not had to keep one leg on the floor; verbal profanity was not allowed; bad guys did not
escape justice. Id.
84. Id. at 83-84.
85. Id. at 119.
86. Id
87. Id., at 120-21.
88. Margarette A. Blanchard, The American Urge to Censor: Freedom of Expression Versus the
Desire to Sanitize Society - From Anthony Comstock to 2 Live Crew, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 741,
784 (citing N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1933, quoted in Richard Corliss, The Legion of Decency, 4 FILM
COMMENT 26 (1968)).
89. Inglis, supra note 82, at 123.
90. Id. at 125.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 142.
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consumer-led movements may offer greater potential than government action to
trigger change in Hollywood.
The second example shows that when consumers and the government
exhort Hollywood in two opposite directions, Hollywood caters to consumer
pressure. In the late 1960s, with the commencement of the post-modern era,
consumers demanded more risqu6 subject matter.93  At the same time, the
government sought to conventionalize movie content through the Hays Code and
restrictive local laws. Shunning these laws, Hollywood listened to the consumers,
offering more salacious content. 94 Accordingly, in 1968, Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer
(MGM) released Michelangelo Antonioni's "Blow-Up." 95 It was the first time
nudity was seen on American movie screens. 96 Once again, consumer-led pressure
had forced Hollywood to modify movie content.
To protect this movie and others like it, studios challenged government
content restrictions in the courts. Unfortunately for the Hays Code and local laws,
the Supreme Court was highly receptive to First Amendment arguments. What
ensued was the wholesale judicial annihilation of these restrictions, 97 both as
applied to movies and other artistic expression. For example, in Interstate Circuit
v. City of Dallas,9 8 Dallas had formed a Motion Picture Classification Board,
which prohibited theaters from showing minors any film that was likely to incite or
encourage minors to engage in crime, sexual promiscuity, or other delinquent
behavior.99 Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall struck down the law as
unconstitutionally vague. 00 Justice Marshall stressed that the scheme was state
action and as such must be "narrowly drawn," with "reasonable and definite
93. See generally Amy M. Adler, Note, Post-Modern Art and the Death of Obscenity Law, 99
YALE L.J. 1359, 1364 (1990) ("Post-modernism not only rejected the Modernist demand that art be
'serious,' it rejected the idea that art must have any traditional 'value' at all."). The movie industry was
also pressured by the advent of television, a competitor that offered a similar service without the hassle
of leaving home. Richard M. Mosk, Motion Picture Ratings in the United States, 15 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 135, 136 (1997).
94. Mosk, supra note 93, at 136.
95. Jacob Septimus, The MPAA Ratings System: A Regime of Private Censorship and Cultural
Manipulation, 21 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 69, 72 (1996).
96. Id.
97. The Court held the following film licensing standards to be unconstitutionally vague:
'[O]f such character as to be prejudicial to the best interests of the people of said
City;' 'moral, educational or amusing and harmless;' 'immoral,' and 'tend to
corrupt morals;' 'approve such films . . . [as] are moral and proper;' '...
disapprove such as are cruel, obscene, indecent or immoral, or such as tend to
debase or corrupt morals.'
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 683 (1968) (citations omitted). This footnote
provides only a sampling of such cases. For a more exhaustive account, see the opinion in Interstate
Circuit, Inc., 390 U.S. 676.
98. 390 U.S. 676 (1968).
99. Id. at 681.
100. Id. at 682.
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standards."' 0 ' Just as the Senate's efforts in the 1930s to rein in Hollywood
content fell short, City of Dallas ensured that efforts by state and municipal
legislatures also stumbled.
The two historical examples given above are instructive for health
advocates wishing to implement either PSAs or an R rating for movies with
tobacco scenes. Above all, the examples demonstrate that congressional and state
attorney general posturing is no substitute for direct consumer pressure. Such
consumer pressure, unlike a congressional hearing alone, has the potential to
manifest itself in diminished returns at the box office and costly private lawsuits
against Hollywood. 10 2 These are the threats that capture Hollywood's attention,
and could force Hollywood to remove smoking scenes, or implement an R rating
or PSA requirement. Consequently, government leaders should envision their role,
at least in significant part, as organizing and channeling direct consumer pressure.
For example, Congress can suggest to consumers effective strategies for applying
direct pressure on Hollywood.1
0 3
This is not to say that direct pressure by government leaders is valueless.
Attorney general and Senate participation in meetings, hearings, and investigations
are vital to produce information. For example, DOJ and FTC investigation of
product placement should focus not just on Big Tobacco, but on Hollywood
involvement as well. Although the government probably cannot punish
Hollywood for product placement, investigations can uncover and spotlight
Hollywood complicity. Government officials should then publicly condemn
Hollywood's involvement."° 4 Such disclosure and condemnation may embarrass
Hollywood, as well as anger Hollywood's traditional audience groups.'
0 5
101. Id. at 690. Marshall added: "Of course ... '[i]t does not follow that the Constitution requires
absolute freedom to exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all times and all places' . . . [however]
restrictions imposed cannot be so vague as to set 'the censor ... adrift upon a boundless sea..." ld. at
684 (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502, 504 (1952)).
102. See infra notes 109-199 and accompanying text (examining a series of legal actions against
Hollywood).
103. For an example of effective consumer strategies, see Press Release, Interfaith Center on
Corporate Responsibility (ICCR), Religious Shareholders Challenge Media Giants' Promotion of
Smoking in Youth-Rated Movies (Nov. 10, 2003) [hereinafter ICCR Press Release],
http://www.smokefreemovies.ucsf.edu/pdf/ShareholderPress 10-10-03.pdf (last visited July 5, 2005).
104. See Clifford Rothman, Smoke Screen: Hollywood Taking Heat for All the Lighting Up in
Films, USA TODAY, Aug. 25, 1997, (detailing various criticism by the Clinton Administration of
Hollywood for tobacco scenes, including a rebuke by Hillary Rodham Clinton for "the mixed message
our children are receiving regarding the use of tobacco products."), available at 1997 WLNR 3051652.
105. See Adler, supra note 35 at 272.
2005]
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
Moreover, recent changes in the political and cultural landscape 10 6 may
foster greater potential for government leaders to pressure Hollywood to alter film
content to promote morality and even religiosity. The evolution of this new
playing field was evidenced by the recent efforts of Senator Ensign, Maryland
Attorney General Joseph Curran, and others. 107 Although these efforts have yet to
bear fruit, increased government involvement and pressure signal growing
confidence that the current landscape is ripe for government-led change.
0 8
B. Direct Consumer Action
Consumer action has proven to be more effective than the government's
attempts to alter Hollywood movie content. In fact, the current socio-political
climate is ripe for broad consumer-based actions to force Hollywood to minimize
the impact of on-screen smoking. 10 9  America is still recovering from the
Columbine, Colorado school shootings, and across the country parents may be
especially receptive to movements calling for greater protection of their
children."0 Therefore, it is useful to consider the methods consumers should use
to reduce the effect of on-screen smoking. Some primary vehicles for direct
106. The Bush Administration has strived to cultivate an image of piety and decorum by taking
conservative positions on social issues. For example, soon after taking office, Attorney General John
Ashcroft, a man deeply conservative in his religious and political views, removed a Sprit of Justice
statue from the Department of Justice's Great Hall because the art deco rendering portrayed a rather
buxom woman with one breast exposed. George McEvoy, 'Spirit of Justice" Under Ashcroft a Mirage,
PALM BEACH POST, Nov. 13, 2004, at 13A.
107. See, e.g., Curran Media Release, supra note 78 (describing Curran's extensive efforts to
address the on-screen tobacco problem).
108. Although government is unlikely to pass laws that infringe on the First Amendment, it might
very well take other action to indirectly impact Hollywood content. For example, the government could
establish its own rating system, which would coexist with the MPAA system. Presumably, government
ratings would better address parental concerns about content, and consequently parents might give
greater regard to these ratings than the MPAA's. However, government ratings would be after-the-fact;
a rating could only be assigned after the movie's release. Moreover, the government could not use
these ratings to restrict a child's access to certain movies.
109. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text (reviewing changes in political climate).
110. See, e.g., President William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks to NATO, Washington, D.C. (June 8,
1999) ("[T]he tragedy at Columbine High School seared itself into our national consciousness. Ever
since that day, our country has been moving steadily away from a culture of youth violence, toward
creating the kind of future we want for our children. People from all walks of life are coming together
in a national grass-roots campaign to prevent youth violence, to give our children the childhoods they
deserve."), http://clinton4.nara.gov/WHiNew/html/19990608a.html (last visited July 5, 2005). See also
Jonathan Seiden, Scream-ing for a Solution: Regulating Hollywood Violence; An Analysis of Legal and
Legislative Remedies, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1010, 1011 ("In the aftermath of the school shootings at
Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado, Hollywood has come under vigorous attack and
criticism for violent images depicted in movies and television."). Prior to the Columbine incident, one
of the murderers reportedly studied "Natural Born Killers" (1994), "in which two crazy kids cut a
carnage swath through the Southwest." Id.
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consumer action are boycotts, as threatened by the Catholic Church in the 1930s,
letter-writing campaigns, and private lawsuits.
Specific strategies for organizing boycotts and letter writing campaigns are
beyond the scope of this paper. However, this section examines the possibility of
private legal action by consumers. In Ginsberg v. State of New York,"' a
companion case to City of Dallas, Justice Brennan laid the groundwork for private
suits by parents challenging Hollywood content. Justice Brennan explained that,
"constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to
authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in
the structure of our society." ' 1 2 He concluded that parents are "entitled to the
support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility.""' 3  Ginsberg
suggests that when any actor such as Hollywood undermines society's efforts to
assist parents, parents derive a legal cause of action against that actor."l
4
Although Justice Brennan did not attempt to clarify specifically how
parents might enforce their rights, more recent cases have provided some
clarification. For example, private citizens could sue Hollywood for devising an
inadequate ratings system, which offers no warning to parents when films contain
dangerously influential tobacco scenes. This section describes three causes of
action against Hollywood: the Article 78 arbitrary and capricious suit, the tort
action, and the shareholder resolution and suit.
1. Article 78
Article 78 is a New York statutory prohibition against arbitrary and
capricious conduct." 5 While Article 78 is a procedure more commonly applied to
review challenges to public administrative agency decisions, it is also available to
review the determinations of private, non-governmental organizations." 6 This
statute applies because the MPAA is a private organization, incorporated in New
111. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
112. Id. at 639. "'It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in
the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder'." Id. (quoting Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 64 S.Ct. 438, 442
(1944)).
113. Id.
114. See id.
115. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7800 et seq. (McKinney 1994 & Supp. 2005). Miramax Films Corp. v. MPAA,
Inc., 560 N.Y.S.2d 730, 731 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990). An Article 78 proceeding addresses the question of:
"whether a determination was made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law or
was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion .... " N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7803(3).
116. See, e.g., Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp., 553 N.E.2d 1317, 1317 (N.Y. 1990)
(corporate co-op board action); Susan M. v. New York Law School, 556 N.E.2d 1104, 1104 (N.Y.
1947) (article 78 proceeding seeking a judgment directing respondent to reinstate her, petitioner alleged
that her private law school's decision to dismiss her was arbitrary and capricious and that her poor
performance in her fourth semester was directly attributable to the irrational testing and grading
procedures of three of her four).
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York.ll 7 To provide necessary backdrop to Article 78 suits against the MPAA, this
section begins by reviewing the forces that led to the creation of the MPAA. Next,
the section discusses Miramax Films Corp. v. MPAA, Inc.," 8 in which a New York
court, reviewing an Article 78 challenge, strongly criticized the MPAA system.
Miramax is readily applicable to actions against the MPAA for failing to warn
parents about on-screen tobacco scenes. The section then considers and contests
Jack Valenti's likely response to such an Article 78 action.
a. Creation of the MPAA and Brief Review of the Modern System
The impetus for the MPAA was lack of a sufficiently effective mechanism
for regulating movie content. In City of Dallas, the Court had established that the
First Amendment prohibited the state from meaningful regulation of movies.1 19
Additionally, in other cases the Court strongly suggested that the government's
censorship powers were insufficient to protect the rights of parents to control what
their children would and would not see. 120 The state could only prevent children
from seeing obscenity, leaving them exposed to films depicting violence, foul
language, and promiscuity. 
12
'
Jack Valenti read these opinions and had the unmistakable sense that the
Justices were speaking directly to him. 122 The Court's emphasis on the obligations
and authority of parents suggested that greater policing of expression, however
necessary, was more than the state could constitutionally require. 123 To Valenti,
implicit in the Court's emphasis was the expectation that some private entity would
fill the gap between what the state could censor, only obscenity, and what parents
wanted to be censored, such as violence and sexual promiscuity.124 Hollywood
117. Miramax, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 732.
118. 560 N.Y.S.2d 730 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990).
119. 390 U.S. 676 (1968).
120. See supra notes 111-14, and accompanying text (discussing Ginsberg).
121. Ginsberg v. State of New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
122. See Peter Bart, Q&A with the Film Industry's Champion, DAILY VARIETY, Apr. 27, 1995, at
16. Valenti:
[T]he Supreme Court said, 'The Dallas Censorship Board as it is now constituted
is now unconstitutional.' And they suggested how they might make it
constitutional. But it also said something that had a seminal ring to it, and it rang
like a twanging wire through the whole fabric of viewing movies: They said
children could be barred from seeing movies but no one could bar adults from
seeing movies.
Id. That Valenti would make such a keen observation is not surprising; he established a reputation as a
shrewd tactician as a member of the Johnson Administration. Id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
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and Valenti saw a golden opportunity to wrest control over content decisions from
the state.1
25
Valenti took action. He walked a tightrope between two sets of consumers:
on the one hand, parents who expected chastity from movies shown to their
children, and on the other hand, post-modernists who craved a more controversial
fare. The result of this tightrope walk has served as the basis for the modem
MPAA system.
126
Under this system, a PG-13 rating indicates that the content of the film is
suitable for any child over the age of thirteen. 127 In contrast, an R rating restricts
children under the age of seventeen from watching the movie in any theater if
unaccompanied by a parent or adult guardian.' 28 A film receives an R based upon,
"among other things, a film's use of language, theme, violence, sex or its portrayal
of drug use.', 129 The MPAA currently does not consider on-screen tobacco use to
warrant an R, a PG-13, or a PG rating. 130 An Article 78 action could challenge the
MPAA's failure to supply an R rating for smoking in movies as arbitrary and
capricious.
b. Miramax
Despite Valenti's initial efforts to cater to parents' concerns, critics have
increasingly railed against the current MPAA system as vague and inadequate.'
3 1
In Miramax, a New York court agreed with these critics. There, petitioner
Miramax, an independent film company, asserted that the MPAA abused its
discretion by operating an arbitrary and capricious rating system. 3 2 It specifically
claimed that the MPAA's X rating was vague and undefined, and therefore an X
for Miramax's "Tie Me Up! Tie Me Down!" ran afoul of New York's Article
78. 133
Although the court held that the Miramax movie was clearly unsuitable for
those under age eighteen, and therefore warranted an X, it issued a scathing
125. See id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. THE CLASSIFICATION AND RATING ADMIN., REASONS FOR MOVIE RATINGS,
http://www.filmratings.comquestions.htm. (last visited July 5, 2005).
129. Id.
130. See id.
131. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, MARKETING VIOLENT ENTERTAINMENT TO CHILDREN: A REVIEW
OF SELF-REGULATION AND INDUSTRY PRACTICES IN THE MOTION PICTURE, MUSIC RECORDING &
ELECTRONIC GAME INDUSTRIES 10 (2000) [hereinafter FTC: MARKETING VIOLENCE] (noting that the
system has been criticized over the years).
132. Miramax Films Corp. v. MPAA, Inc., 560 N.Y.S.2d 730, 731 (1990).
133 Id
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critique of the MPAA system. 34 It observed that the MPAA's purported purpose,
to help parents decide which movies are appropriate for their children, was a
myth. 135 Instead, "the standard [applied by the MPAA] is a marketing standard, a
tool to aid in promoting films."' 36 The court noted with consternation that the
MPAA's initial Rating Board and the Ratings Appeals Board members have "no
special qualifications."' 37 In fact, to qualify for Board membership, the MPAA
only requires parenthood experience, a passion for cinema, and "intelligent
maturity of judgment."'' 38
The court concluded that the MPAA was abusing its discretion; the rating
system was so flawed that an adequately presented case could render the MPAA
liable under Article 78.139
[T]he MPAA should strongly consider some changes in its methods of
operations to properly perform its stated mission. Unless such concerns
are meaningfully dealt with, the MPAA may find its rating system
subject to viable legal challenge by those groups adversely affected
herein, including organizations charged with the responsibility of
protecting children.14
0
This precedent may very well provide consumers with a cause of action
against the MPAA to apply an R rating to films with tobacco scenes. As noted, the
MPAA formulates its guidelines and applies ratings without the assistance of any
professional opinion. This haphazard system makes no effort to address the
possibility that parents desire an R rating for on-screen smoking. Without
endeavoring to address this possibility, the MPAA has left itself vulnerable to an
Article 78 challenge.
In response to such an assertion, Valenti would counter that the MPAA's
rating system is not arbitrary or capricious. He would most likely cite parental
surveys that show a high rate of~familiarity and satisfaction with the MPAA
134. Id. at 735.
135. See id. ("What is offensive is the unprofessional standard itself..
136. Id.
137. Id. at 733.
138. Id. (quoting VALENTI, MPAA, VOLUNTARY MOVIE RATING SYSTEM 5 (1987)).
139. Id. at 736.
140. Id. Although Miramax only specified that organizations protecting the interests of children
were situated to bring Article 78 claims, additional parties may have standing. Id. For instance, parents
of children that "[are] or will be affected" by the MPAA's arbitrary and capricious rating system may
also bring an Article 78 claim. Sun-Brite Car Wash, Inc. v. Bd. of Zoning and Appeals, 515 N.Y.S.2d
418, 422 (1987). The court explained that in Article 78 cases, "proof of special damage or in-fact injury
is not required in every instance to establish that the [plaintiff's interests are] adversely affected." Id.
See also Caso v. N.Y. State Public High School Athletic Ass'n., Inc., 434 N.Y.S.2d 60, 62 (1980)
(allowing a parent to sue on behalf of his son when the Athletic Association determined his son
ineligible to participate in high school gymnastics). If standing would be conferred to an organization
charged with the responsibility of caring for children, certainly parents should also have standing, since
they too care for their children.
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system. Whenever Valenti makes a public appearance, he mentions that 90% of
parents are familiar with the rating system, and 75% find it "useful.' 14 1
Consequently, Valenti concludes, the MPAA fulfills its mission to assist parents
with their parental responsibilities. 1
42
However, Valenti's assertion that a 75% satisfaction rate is "high" is
certainly contestable. Furthermore, Valenti neglects to mention that the same
surveys show that 50% of parents say that the MPAA does a "fair or poor" job of
informing them about certain content, such as violence.' 43 Presumably, the survey
does not even inquire about smoking. And perhaps most importantly, even if some
parents do not consider smoking in movies problematic for their children, the
reason for this may simply be that they are unaware of the correlation between
viewing on-screen smoking and developing a smoking habit. If, as the Miramax
court recommends, the MPAA used the opinion of professionals when formulating
guidelines, it could issue ratings based upon what all parents, were they informed,
would want for their children. As the court in Miramax notes, because the MPAA
shuns these professional opinions, the system is "capricious."'
44
2. Tort Action
The second possible private action asserts a breach of duty. For this action,
private plaintiffs might be able to sue Hollywood under state tort law. To establish
a cause of action in negligence a plaintiff must generally prove the existence of
four elements: a duty owed to him (or to a class of which he is a part) by the
defendant, a breach of that duty, a legally cognizable causal relationship between
the breach of duty and the injuries suffered ("causation"), and injuries. 45 If a child
sees movies with tobacco use because the MPAA negligently failed to restrict
access with an R rating, or if a child sees on-screen smoking without first being
shown a PSA, and the child incurs the injury of a nicotine addiction, the parents
could argue that Hollywood failed to exercise duties to the parents.
Precedent supports a tort action. An example is Abrams v. City of
Rockville. 146  In Abrams, the City of Rockville, through its Department of
Recreation and Parks, operated an after-school activities program for elementary
school children of working parents. 14 In May, 1988, program employees showed
141. FTC: MARKETING VIOLENCE, supra note 13 1, at 10. See also Bart, supra note 122 (noting that
Valenti is most proud of the ratings system he helped to create).
142. See FTC: MARKETING VIOLENCE, supra note 131 (noting that the MPAA does not require
explanations of its ratings system in advertisements).
143. Id. at 10-11.
144. Miramax Films Corp. v. MPAA, Inc., 560 N.Y.S.2d 730, 736 (1990).
145. See, e.g., Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank of Maryland, 515 A.2d 756, 758 (Md. 1986).
146. 596 A.2d 116 (Md. App. 1991).
147. Id. at 117.
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the PG-rated movie "Poltergeist."'' 48 Afterwards, seven-year old Andrea Abrams
suffered great anxiety and psychological stress, manifested by sleeplessness and
nightmares.149 Her parents alleged tort liability against the city.
5
The court agreed.' 5 1 It held that the defendant's duty was "implicit from
the very nature 52 of the program they were operating.' 5 3 The city breached this
duty because it showed to a child a movie that was "unsuitable" for her.' 54 Indeed,
the movie was PG, suggesting "parental guidance," yet the defendant showed the
girl the movie while her parents were absent.'5 Moreover, the court found that if
the plaintiffs were to prove all the alleged facts, the harm was "at least foreseeable,
if not likely."' 156 As a result, it was "clear" that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged
all four elements of tort negligence. 57
Delgado v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc.' 5 8 also provides guidance. There,
a theater permitted a child unaccompanied by an adult to enter an R-rated movie.'
59
The thirteen-year-old became excited during the movie's violent scenes and told
his friends that he wanted to shoot someone. 60 Immediately after the movie, the
boy shot and killed the plaintiff parents' son, one and one-half blocks from the
theater.' 6' The parents filed a tort suit, alleging that by admitting the boy to an R
movie, the theater and the MPAA had breached their duty of care to society at
large.
162
The court ruled against the parents, reasoning that the purpose of the rating
system was not to protect society at large.163 However, the court added that the
148. Id. at 118.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 122.
152. Hollywood defendants might attempt to distinguish Abrams by arguing that in that case, the
court only found a duty was owed based upon the unique nature of the defendant's public after-school
program. For more discussion on this point, see first full paragraph of Section IlI.C.
153. Abrams v. City of Rockville, 596 A.2d 116, 122 (Md. App. 1991).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. 84 Cal.2d 838 (1999).
159. Id. at 839-40.
160. Id. at 839.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 840.
163. Id. at 841 (citing Miramax Films Corp. v. MPAA, 560 N.Y.S.2d 730, 732 (1990)). Had the
murderer's parents been sued, they could have impleaded the MPAA. See Joseph W. Glannon, Liability
of Multiple Tortfeasors in Massachusetts: The Related Doctrines of Joint and Several Liability,
Comparative Negligence and Contribution, 85 MASS. L. REV. 50, 70-71 (2000) (explaining that a
defendant who impleads a third-party defendant for contribution will bear the burden to establish that
the impleaded party is "jointly liable in tort" for the plaintiff's injury). Even so, this point probably
does not apply in the context of on-screen smoking actions. The only conceivable scenario is that a
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MPAA and the theater did owe a duty to the parents of children admitted to
movies.' 64  Specifically, this duty is to help parents exercise control over the
movies their children see.' 65  "[T]he movie-rating system's duty flows to
parents. ' 166 Accordingly, the appellate court held that, although the MPAA and
the theater did not owe a duty of care to the parents of the slain boy, it did owe
such a duty to parents to prevent a child from seeing a movie unsuitable for that
child. 167
When combined, Abrams and Delgado may support a cause of action
against the MPAA for showing on-screen smoking to children, and thereby making
a nicotine habit much more likely. For brevity, I will refer to a plaintiff bringing
such an action as Plaintiff X. Like Abrams, Plaintiff X can demonstrate significant
injury: nicotine addiction. 168  Experts project that nicotine addiction leads to a
tobacco-related death for one out of three new smokers. 1
69
Further, Plaintiff X can establish a duty. The MPAA owes parents a duty
not to allow children unaccompanied by parents to see movies that are "unsuitable"
for them. The MPAA owes this duty because it is responsible for devising the
rating system that controls which movies children are permitted to see without a
parent. Indeed, in both Delgado and Abrams, the courts held that the duty was
owed by the entity responsible for deciding whether to show the movie to
children. 170  Hollywood defendants might attempt to distinguish Abrams by
victim of second-hand smoke could sue someone who developed a nicotine habit by watching on-screen
smoking, and then the defendant could try to implead the MPAA.
164. Delgado v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 85 Cal.2d. 838, 840 (1999).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 841. The court explained the source of this duty: "[C]reation of a legal duty is
fundamentally a policy determination: 'The existence of a legal duty is a question of law which is
simply an expression of the sum total of the policy considerations that lead a court to conclude that a
particular plaintiff is entitled to protection . I..."' d  at 840. (citing Jacoves v. United Merchandising
Corp., II Cal.2d 468 (1992)).
167. Id. at 840-41.
168. Any lesser injury than nicotine addiction would unlikely suffice. For example, simply seeing
on-screen smoking would probably not constitute a tort injury. Such an experience only increases the
likelihood of the injury, or nicotine addiction; it is not the injury itself. See, e.g., Jacques v. First Nat'l
Bank of Maryland, 515 A.2d 756 (1986). In the same vein, smoking once or twice probably does not
constitute an injury as defined under state tort law because, once again, this only increases the
likelihood of addiction. Id.
169. See CDC, DHHS, PROJECTED SMOKING RELATED DEATHS AMONG YOUTH - UNITED STATES,
45 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) 971 (Nov. 8, 1996) (finding that between ten and
thirty-seven percent of young smokers' deaths will be attributable to their early smoking habits),
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00044348.htm (last visited July 5, 2005). One
difficulty, though, will be establishing that the child has in fact developed a nicotine addiction. To
establish addiction, a plaintiff might introduce evidence of purchasing nicotine cessation devices over a
prolonged period of time. In addition, if the plaintiff has sought professional assistance to quit
smoking, these professionals could testify as to the plaintiffs addiction.
170. Delgado v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 85 Cal.2d 838 (1999); Abrams v. City of Rockville,
596 A.2d 116 (Md. App, 1991).
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arguing that, in that case, the court only found a duty was owed because of the
unique nature of the defendant's public after-school program. However, Delgado
involved a private defendant, and in that case the court also found the MPAA owed
a duty.17' Like Delgado, Plaintiff X can establish that the MPAA owed a duty to
the parents simply by alleging that the child went to the theater to watch a movie.
The breach of duty in Abrams is also apposite to Plaintiff X's case. In
Abrams, the City showed a movie unsuitable for a child when her parents were not
there. Similarly, Plaintiff X can argue that the MPAA, by devising a flawed rating
system, decided to show the child on-screen smoking, which is generally
unsuitable for children unaccompanied by a parent. To support this point, Plaintiff
X can rely on Dalton's studies, 7 2 which establish a correlation between the
MPAA's decision to show on-screen smoking to children, and extreme harm to
children.1 73 Movies that may significantly harm children certainly seem unsuitable
for them, especially in the absence of their parents.' 74 Therefore, the MPAA has
breached its duty to Plaintiff X.
The most difficult element for Plaintiff X to establish will be causation.
However, as mentioned, studies by Dalton and others demonstrate that children
who watch the most big-screen movies are three times more likely to start
smoking.1 75 Arguably, 7 6 Plaintiff X has as good a case for causation as Abrams,
who produced no such research for the effects of scary movies. The case for
causation would be more compelling if Plaintiff X could show the absence of other
factors that cause children to start smoking, such as peer pressure. Such an
absence will be very difficult to establish. Nonetheless, as statistical analysis of
causation is refined, the ability of plaintiffs to mount a successful tort action may
improve.
For brevity, this section only has involved challenges to showing R-rated
movies to children. However, parents could also sue Hollywood for negligently
failing to show PSAs prior to movies containing smoking scenes. Indeed, parents
could assert that in choosing to omit PSAs, Hollywood breaches its duty to parents
by failing to take steps to neutralize movie content harmful to their children.
Again, however, proving causation is an onerous task.
171. Delgado, 85 Cal.2d at 840-41.
172. See Dalton, supra note 13.
173. Id.
174. Further, Plaintiff X can use the language of Miramax as precedent for the MPAA's general
negligence in determining suitable content. Miramax Films Corp. v. MPAA, 560 N.Y.S.2d 730, 735-36
(1990).
175. See Dalton, supra note 13, at 284.
176. Although Dalton's studies show a correlation, causation is far from clear. See O'Connell,
supra note 47 (Valenti, for example, has rejected Dalton's findings, saying that human behavior is far
too complex for researchers to be able to isolate movies as the basis for an adolescent's smoking habit).
In fact, even Dalton's finding of a correlation is currently the subject of heated debate.
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3. Shareholder Resolution
In addition to the Article 78 and state tort law actions, consumers have at
least one other action against Hollywood at their disposal: the anti-smoking
shareholder resolution to change corporate Hollywood's policies. In shareholder
resolutions, shareholders demand that management investigate a specific corporate
policy and reconsider this policy at the following annual board meeting. 177 These
resolutions communicate to the board of directors that the shareholders are
dissatisfied with corporate policies. Resolutions by religious shareholders have
succeeded in changing policies at Phillip Morris (Atria), McDonald's, International
Flavors and Fragrances, Kimberly-Clark, Knight-Ridder, 3M, RJR Nabisco,
Eastman Kodak and Wendy's.1
78
Shareholder resolutions arise because occasionally corporate boards of
directors do not operate in the interests of their shareholders. In gigantic
businesses, such as prominent Hollywood studios and their parent corporations, no
one shareholder or shareholding group possesses enough shares to exercise control
of the corporation through the election of a majority of the board of directors. 179
Consequently, "[t]he board of directors, theoretically composed of representatives
of various shareholding groups, is instead peopled by individuals selected by
management."' 80 This phenomenon has been described as the "captured board"
syndrome.'18  When the captured board commits some breach of duty that directly
injures the corporation's shareholders, shareholders often feel compelled to issue a
resolution. 82
Institutional shareholders, or entities with large amounts to invest,183 are
particularly well-suited to bring resolutions. 184  Typically, they are the largest
shareholders in a given corporation. 8 1 It is true that senior executives at these
177. Nolo, Corporate Resolution Definition, at http://www.nolo.com/definition.cfm/Term/
8F2A917D-B43F-4D96-84097038DA2A9FA4/alpha/C/ (last visited July 5, 2005).
178. ICCR Press Release, supra note 103.
179. Charles M. Elson, The Duty of Care, Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63 U. CIN. L. REV.
649, 656 (1995).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 657.
182. Reinier Kraakman et al., When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests? 82 GEO. L.J.
1733, 1733-34 (1994).
183. See id Institutional investors are covered by fewer protective regulations because it is
assumed that they are more knowledgeable and better able to protect themselves. These investors
account for a majority of overall trading volume. See id. See also InvestorWords.com, Volume, at
http://www.investorwords.com/5258/institutionalinvestor.html (last visited July 5, 2005).
184. E-mail from Jono Polansky, Director, OnBeyond, to Matthew Fuchs (Dec. 9, 2004, 15:05:43
EST) (copy on file with the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy) ("[M]anagement may and frequently
does make contact with the [resolution] filers to test their resolve and sophistication and to try to get the
resolution withdrawn").
185. InvestorWords.com, Institutional Investor, at http://www.investorwords.com/2504/institutional
_investor.html (last visited July 5, 2005).
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corporations also hold large numbers of shares. 186  However, the shareholder
resolution should not be viewed as a contest between filers and executives to see
who has the most shares. 187 Institutional shareholders concede that they do not
have the power to dictate new policies to management. 88  Nevertheless,
resolutions are potentially effective because they pressure a board to seriously
contemplate the institutional shareholder's position.'
8 9
Indeed, because of their size, institutional shareholders have the resources
and sophistication to effectively argue that the positions they advocate makes good
business sense) 9° As one NGO advises, "A prudent investor should engage
management to look into the matter and control any potential risks."',9 1  As
evidenced by recent successes in other contexts, 192 institutional shareholders
frequently convince management that a policy indeed constitutes a potential risk.
The institutional shareholder can argue that by continuing to display tobacco
scenes, corporations involved in making movies leave themselves vulnerable to
legal prosecution. 93 Thus, the resolution is an effective vehicle for consumers to
persuade Hollywood to make changes. 1
94
On November 10, 2003, an institutional investor called the Interfaith
Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR)' 95 filed the first of four duplicate sets
of shareholder resolutions with parent corporations of Hollywood studios. 196 The
186. Id.
187. E-mail from Jono Polansky, supra note 184.
188. Id.
189. "Showings of five percent or more in favor of 'social responsibility' resolutions are frequently
considered successful; with millions of shares outstanding, management takes that kind of number
seriously and will usually enter into policy discussions aimed at resolving the problem." Id.
190. Id.
191. SMOKING AND MOVIES SHAREHOLDER OUTREACH NETWORK, FREQUENT QUESTIONS
[hereinafter SHAREHOLDER FREQUENT QUESTIONS], at http://www.proxyinfornation.com/sfm/
questions.htm. (last visited July 5, 2005). Indeed, one of the Interfaith Center on Corporate
Responsibility's resolutions warns that, "As public awareness and research evidence grows, this
corporation's continued, knowing inclusion of smoking in youth-rated films increases its exposure to
consumer opprobrium and to potential liability." Smokefree Movies: 2004 - General Electric Company
(NBC), at http://www.iccr.org/shareholder/proxybook04/MEMBER%20ISSUES/TEENTOBAC
_TIMEWARNERAOLGene 3578.HTM (last visited July 5, 2005).
192. ICCR Press Release, supra note 103, and accompanying text.
193. See SHAREHOLDER FREQUENT QUESTIONS, supra note 191.
194. See id.
195. ICCR is a coalition of 275 Protestant Catholic and Jewish institutional investors with more
than $100 billion in equities. Desiring to balance social and fiscal responsibility in their investing, these
institutions work together to challenge companies on environmental practices and other social issues of
concern. One of these is tobacco. ICCR's prioritization of this issue is also valuable because ICCR is
geared towards mobilizing consumer pressure. ICCR members sponsor actions such as prayer vigils,
letter writing campaigns and consumer boycots. INTERFAITH CENTER ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
(ICCR), ABOUT ICCR, at http://www.iccr.org/about/ (last visited July 5, 2005).
196. ICCR Press Release, supra note 103. The Disney resolutions were filed November 10, 2003.
The GE resolutions were filed in November, 2004, and the Time Warner and Viacom resolutions were
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resolutions are against General Electric (Universal), Time Warner (Warner Bros.),
Viacom (Paramount), and Walt Disney.' 97  ICCR called on these parent
corporations to investigate each studio's use of tobacco in movies aimed at young
audiences. 198 Specifically, ICCR requested that studios take a series of remedial
measures, including an R rating for movies with smoking and PSAs. Although the
success of these resolutions is still pending,' 99 such actions are promising.
In sum, parents and health advocates have a series of legal mechanisms at
their disposal to pressure Hollywood to minimize the impact of big-screen tobacco.
Although none of these mechanisms will create sure-fire, open and shut cases, they
all make changes in Hollywood possible. Even if plaintiffs fall short in convincing
courts of liability, Hollywood still pays a financial burden for having to contest
these actions. Further, suits and resolutions help publicize the problem of on-
screen smoking, which increases pressure on Hollywood to make substantive
policy changes.
C. Hollywood
Hollywood, of course, has the most power to achieve improvements. On
other public health issues, Hollywood has waged aggressive, highly publicized
campaigns for pro-health reforms.200  However, without sufficient external
pressure, it is unlikely that Hollywood will act to minimize the impact of on-screen
smoking. Although pushed by health advocates and consumers to implement an R
rating or PSA system, in public statements of its position, Hollywood makes clear
filed in December, 2004. E-mail from Conrad MacKerron, Director of Corporate Social Responsibility
Program, ICCR, to Matthew Fuchs (Nov. 17, 2004) (on file with the Journal of Health Care Law &
Policy).
197. ICCR Press Release, supra note 103.
198. Id.
199. See E-mail from Conrad MacKerron, supra note 196.
200. See, e.g., Amy Pyle, Hollywood Backs California Cigarette Tax Increase, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1,
1998, http://www.no-smoking.org/oct98/10-01-98-2.html (last visited July 5, 2005). In 1998,
Hollywood director Rob Reiner testified at a state legislature hearing, in favor of a 50-cent tax on
cigarette packs. Id. Reiner also campaigned for the bill by convincing director Steven Spielberg and
actor Robin Williams to join the crusade. Id. Although Reiner and a few others have recently said they
would try to eliminate "gratuitous" smoking from their films, they seem considerably less energized to
wage a public health campaign that countervails self-interests. Id. See also DGA Responds, supra note
78. In addition, prominent members of Hollywood have vociferously advocated animal rights, human
rights, and the environment. Press Release, Artivist Film Festival, Film Gala at Hollywood Egyptian
Theater Unites Rare Art and Activists to Wake Up World (Apr. 27, 2004), http://www.prweb.com/
releases/2004/4/prwebxmll21835.php (last visited July 5, 2005). Hollywood is also well-known for
trumpeting support for liberal political candidates. See Anne-Marie O'Connor & Ronald Brownstein,
America Coming Together: Hollywood Political Event Stirs Up Storm, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2003
(reporting on a gathering for deep-pocketed Hollywood liberals to discuss a strategy for electing a
Democratic president in 2004), http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/1203-09.htm (last visited
July 5, 2005).
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that it would prefer neither. Hollywood is reluctant for two primary reasons:
economic concerns, and concerns about diminished creative freedoms.
1. Reluctance Stemming from Economic Implications
Hollywood's reluctance might best be explained by pure economics. Like
any industry, Hollywood operates according to financial incentives. Moreover, the
industry is currently in the midst of an economic slump, and is therefore especially
sensitive to any economic threats. 20 1 Hollywood believes that an R rating for
depiction of smoking would be an extra economic burden that it cannot tolerate.
Indeed, Hollywood predicts that such a change would subject it to an
economic "catch-22. 2 °2 On the one hand, Hollywood could respond to this new
rating requirement by removing cigarettes from movies, thereby avoiding an R
203rating. At least in theory, Hollywood would then capture its prized
demographic, teenagers, who would still be able to see the film without an adult.
204
However, Hollywood's concern is that, were it to extract cigarettes, it would at the
same time eliminate the forbidden fruit that entices teens to theaters.21 Indeed,
PG-13 movies attract teens so effectively precisely because they include risqu6
subject matter, such as tobacco use.20 6
Director Steven Spielberg explains:
[I]t's better to get a PG-13 than a PG for certain movies. Sometimes
PG, unless it's for an animated movie, it turns a lot of young people off.
They think it's going to be too below their radar and they tend to want
to say, 'Well, PG-13 might have a little bit of hot sauce on it.'
20 7
Without the promise of "hot sauce," Hollywood worries that unenthused teens will
stay away from theaters.
201. NAT'L ASS'N OF THEATRE OWNERS (NATO), RESPONSE OF NATO TO THE REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 2 (Nov. 2, 2000) [hereinafter NATO
RESPONSE] ("For any observer who has read the business page lately, they are aware that the motion
picture exhibition industry faces very tough economic times. Better ratings policies won't mean a thing
to a theatre that closes its doors to the public."), http://www.natoonline.org/NATO_FTCResponse.pdf
(last visited July 5, 2005).
202. See Miramax Films Corp. v. MPAA, 560 N.Y.S.2d 730, 732 (1990) ("(T]he tremendous
impact of [MPAA] ratings to the economic viability of a film is undisputed.").
203. It seems likely that Hollywood would react to the R rating requirement by extracting tobacco
scenes. In fact, Hollywood currently edits out violence from movies so that these movies will receive
the PG-13 rating. STANTON GLANTZ, SMOKE FREE MOVIES, THE SOLUTION: RATE SMOKING MOVIES
R, http://www.smokefreemovies.ucsf.edu/solution/r-rating.html (last visited July 5, 2005).
204. Id.
205. See Mekemson & Glantz, supra note 1, at 6 (explaining how Hollywood has used smoking as a
"forbidden fruit" to attract viewers).
206. Bates & Wallace, supra note 75.
207. Anthony Breznican, PG-13 at 20: How Gremlins and Indiana Jones remade Hollywood,
ENTERTAINMENT TODAY, Aug. 27, 2004, http://www.ent-today.com/features/aug04/fD82704pg I 3.htm
(last visited July 5, 2005).
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Moreover, in Hollywood's opinion, the only other option would be even
more financially problematic. This other option is for Hollywood to keep tobacco
scenes and therefore apply an R. Then, teens would be forbidden from paying to
see these movies. Along these lines, Dade Hayes, a writer for Daily Variety, a
Hollywood trade publication, argues, "It's too punitive to say that just because
tobacco is present, you have an automatic R, because an R rating really can be a
commercial handicap.,
20 8
However, such arguments grounded in economics are ultimately
unconvincing. By focusing only on economics, Hollywood ignores its social
responsibility to help the government and parents to protect children.20 9 Moreover,
Hollywood is incorrect in its belief that an R rating for smoking will necessarily
dent its profit margin. Indeed, if Hollywood removes tobacco from PG-13 movies,
plenty of other flavors of "hot sauce" still remain available to entice teens to the
ticket booth.21 ° Of course, it is far from ideal for Hollywood to glamorize driving
fast or eating junk food. 21 1 However, the depiction of either of these vices is
preferable to smoking, the most deadly of the preventable causes of illness
212America. Consequently, Hollywood does not need tobacco to lure the teen
demographic, and thus its economics argument falls short.
2. Reluctance Because of Creative Freedom Implications
Another reason for Hollywood's aversion to an R rating or PSA is that it
worries that First Amendment rights are at stake. Although a voluntary R rating
for smoking would not constitute an actionable First Amendment problem, as the
government is not the censor, adoption of such a rating system would force
directors to increase censorship. The Directors Guild harps on this theme, to the
exclusion of any other substantive reason for rejecting change, such as economic
concerns.2 13 In fact, in public statements on this issue, Hollywood rarely speaks in
208. All Things Considered, Analysis: Anti-Tobacco Activists Pressure Movie Industry to Assign R
Rating to Movies with Scenes of Smoking (Nat'l Pub. Radio broadcast, Dec. 5, 2003),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=l 534487 (last visited July 5, 2005).
209. See, e.g., Brian Witte, Attorneys General Push Hollywood to Cut Down on Smoking in Movies,
AsSoc. PRESS, Dec. 17, 2003 (paraphrasing Utah Attorney General Mark Shurtleff as saying that
Hollywood directors must try to find a balance between creative free speech and social responsibility),
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/news/archive/2003/12/17/state2 101 EST01 46.DTL (last
visited July 5, 2005). At times, Hollywood acknowledges its social responsibility. In fact, the DGA
has formed a "Social Responsibility" Task Force. DGA Responds, supra note 78.
210. See DGA Responds, supra note 78 (noting that Hollywood depicts other controversial
behavior besides smoking).
211. Id.
212. SURGEON GENERAL 2004, supra note 5, at 1. In other words, health advocates prefer a movie
with only fast car driving and junk food, rather than a movie with these two types of scenes on top of
smoking scenes.
213. See supra notes 201-212 and accompanying text.
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economic terms. 21 4 It instead explains its reluctance by citing its passion for First
Amendment rights and uninhibited creativity. 21 5  This public stance probably
reflects Hollywood's sense that the economics argument makes Hollywood appear
greedy, whereas the First Amendment argument evokes Hollywood's virtuosity.
216
In 1997, then-DGA president Jack Shea spoke before the California State
Senate Committee on the Judiciary and said, "The DGA strongly believes that any
legislative measure that infringes upon a director's right to make [choices on the
depiction of smoking] is a violation of our freedom of expression protections in the
United States Constitution."2" 7
This commitment to protect its First Amendment rights was most recently
expressed in a July 2004 statement by DGA of Hollywood's position on smoking
in movies.2 18 First and foremost, DGA opposed "any efforts at ... interference
with the creative process. 21 9 It clarified that, "[h]aving characters smoke is a
creative decision to be exercised by each individual director." 2 0 DGA then
explained the reasons why directors often decide that their characters should
smoke: "[s]moking, like most personal traits, can be important to defining and
understanding a character's behavior and motives and is often necessary in regard
to establishing historical accuracy and 'life as it is."'
221
With respect to the imposition of an R rating, Hollywood's First
Amendment argument is, at least on some levels, compelling for consumers. It is
the kind of rhetoric that can deflect consumer pressure to make changes, by
striking a patriotic chord with Hollywood's consumer-base.222 Indeed, as perhaps
most influentially articulated in Justice Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. United
214. See, e.g. DGA Responds, supra note 78 (speaking comprehensively about First Amendment
rights throughout the article, but omitting any mention of the economic impact of the R rating and
PSA).
215. Id.
216. See id. In the late 1980s, Phillip Morris hired The Dolphin Group, a public relations firm
whose main goal was to conceal the economic interests of Big Tobacco and Hollywood behind the
rallying cry of protecting creative freedom. "[Dolphin] is looking for directors, producers, film
commission representatives, etc., to express opposition to the censorship a bill like [Senator] Luken's
would impose on the creative ability of the motion picture industry." Letter from Frank Devaney,
Senior Vice President, Corporate Division, Rogers & Cowan, Inc., to W. Andrew Copenhaver,
Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice (June 23, 1989), http://xjrtdocs.com/rjrtdocs/image_downloader.
wmt?MODE=PDF&SEARCH=0&ROW= I&DOCRANGE=515687482+-7482&CAMEFROM = &
tab=search (last visited July 11, 2005).
217. DGA Responds, supra note 78.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id
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States,223 the extensive protections granted to speech in America separate this
224country from other democracies. Moreover, the argument is constitutionally
inscrutable; Congress lacks the power to restrict a child's access based on tobacco
scenes.
225
However, with regard to calls for PSA implementation, Hollywood's First
Amendment argument is simply off-topic. A pre-movie, anti-tobacco PSA has no
effect on the First Amendment rights of filmmakers. 226 Indeed, following the PSA,
the movie would proceed precisely as the film's creators envisioned it.227 Theaters
are especially hard-pressed to reject PSAs in light of the fact that theaters now
show commercial ads before movies.
Moreover, the PSA has the potential to effectively reduce the impact of on-
screen smoking. Recent research has found that these antismoking ads can
inoculate youth to depictions of smoking in films. 2 28 Indeed, showing just one
antismoking ad immediately before a film in which cigarettes play a role makes
teens immune to images that glamorize smoking. 229 Researchers showed a thirty-
second anti-smoking PSA to teens before screenings of the popular PG-13 movie
"Reality Bites," in which Winona Ryder and Ethan Hawke light up in twelve out of
forty scenes.230 A control group watched the movie without seeing the PSA.
Those who saw the anti-smoking ad emerged from the film with negative views
about smoking, while the others expressed positive attitudes. 231
Another advantage of the PSA is that, unlike in the case of an R rating, the
PSA approach does not raise enforcement problems.232 If PSAs are run before all
movies with smoking, then even teens who sneak into R rated movies will still be
impacted by the PSA. Consequently, the effect of on-screen smoking is
neutralized. Equally important, Hollywood could put PSAs at the beginning of
223. 250 U.S. 616 (1919). In this dissent, Holmes embraced John Stuart Mill's marketplace of
ideas doctrine, which emphasizes the importance of protecting even false speech. See id. at 626-28
(Holmes, J., dissenting); see also JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1974).
224. See Abrams, 250 U.S. 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T]he best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market .... That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution."); see also R v. Keegstra, [1996] W.C.B.J. 654653, where Canadian Supreme Court
Justice Dickson offered a comparatively narrow version of the marketplace of ideas.
225. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
226. SMOKE FREE MOVIES, THE SOLUTION: REQUIRE ANTI-TOBACCO ADS ("Since the anti-smoking
advertisement would precede the film, it does not impose any restrictions on the creativity or artistic
freedom of the film-makers or actors."), at http://smokefreemovies.ucsf.edu/solution/anti-tobacco_
ads.html (last visited July 5, 2005).
227. See id.
228. Cornelia Pechmann & Chuan-Fong Shih, Smoking Scenes in Movies and Antismoking
Advertisements Before Movies: Effects on Youth, 63 J. MARKETING 1 (Jul. 1999).
229. Id. at 9.
230. Id. at 7.
231. Id. at 6, 9.
232. See supra note 203.
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home videos with smoking scenes.233 However, if Hollywood adopted only an R
rating for on-screen smoking, and no PSAs, then the numerous teens who sneak
into R-rated movies and watch such movies on home video would still be exposed
to smoking scenes. This enforcement problem is especially relevant because
studios admit to marketing R movies to teens.234  Therefore, for the R-rating
approach to work at all, enforcement would be essential; theaters must prevent
teens from sneaking into R movies without a parent. However, such prevention is
unlikely; the National Association of Theaters of Owners' (NATO) 235 enforcement
record is abysmal.236
NATO, the largest theater trade organization, is the major Hollywood
engine responsible for implementing PSAs.237  NATO cannot claim cost as a
prohibitive factor in iniplementing PSAs. In fact, quite possibly, nonprofit groups
such as the American Cancer Society, the American Heart Association, and the
American Lung Association would be willing to pay for the PSAs, or at least help
Hollywood cover the expense.238  Even without such assistance, the costs are
relatively minor. For example, Massachusetts, which has implemented PSAs, paid
just $43 per screen per week to run its ads. 239 As researcher Cornelia Pechmann
240
writes, PSAs are a "win-win" situation.
233. GLANTZ, supra note 203. Watching videotapes and DVDs are the primary means by which
teens see R rated movies. Id.
234. See FTC: MARKETING VIOLENCE, supra note 131, at 13 (reporting that Hollywood targets
children under the age of 17 for R rated movie marketing).
235. "[NATO] is the largest exhibition trade organization in the world, representing more than
26,000 movie screens in all 50 states and in more than 20 countries worldwide. [M]embership includes
the largest cinema chains in the world and hundreds of independent theater owners too." NATO,
ABOUT NATO, at http://www.natoonline.org/aboutnato.htm (last visited July 5, 2005). NATO also co-
founded the movie rating system with MPAA. NATO RESPONSE, supra note 201, at 1.
236. FTC: MARKETING VIOLENCE, supra note 131. "Despite the official policy that children under
17 should not be admitted to an R-rated movie unless accompanied by a parent or guardian, such
children gain access in a variety of ways." Id. at 19. In the summer of 2000, the FTC conducted an
undercover study of NATO enforcement: rating information was not posted 46% of the time; a child
was able to purchase a ticket for an R movie 46% of the time, and the employee asked the child's age
only 48% of the time. Id. In NATO's response to the FTC's report, NATO promised compliance
inspections, among other affirmative steps to bolster enforcement. NATO RESPONSE, supra note 201,
at 3.
237. See NATO RESPONSE, supra note 201, at 4 (adopting various educational measures).
238. Pechmann & Shih, supra note 228 at 10.
239. Id. Assuming that these cost estimates are reasonably representative, antismoking
advertisements could be run for six months on the roughly 49,000 United States movie screens for
approximately $40 million. Id. The ads would run periodically, rather than before every movie with
smoking, to minimize tedium. Id. Some other states have taken a proactive role in funding
antismoking PSAs before movies with smoking. In addition to Massachusetts, last year the Vermont
Department of Health started a statewide PSA campaign, asking theaters to show a thirty-second anti-
tobacco trailer before any movie in which there was smoking. Nine of twenty-one theaters agreed to
show the trailers. Press Release, Vermont Dep't of Health, Vermont Teens Launch Statewide Effort to
Encourage Theaters to Show Anti-Smoking Movie Trailers (Mar. 26, 2003), http://smokefreemovie.
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NATO, however, as well as independent theater owners, is under no
obligation to run antismoking ads, and could be reluctant, even when offered
payment. 241  One concern may be that the ads will be too serious and even
depressing for consumers, putting a damper on the otherwise carefree theater
242
experience. Theater owners seem to prefer using lighthearted, humorous
advertisements. 243 Moreover, designing anti-smoking PSAs that are effective but
also lighthearted may be a difficult assignment. Research demonstrates that anti-
smoking PSAs that focus on social disapproval are most effective with adolescent
audiences.244 Accordingly, PSAs only curtail teens' smoking intentions when they
depict smokers as disheveled "losers" in a variety of unattractive life
245circumstances. It remains to be seen whether ad executives can design social
disapproval PSAs that are sufficiently light-hearted to satisfy Hollywood.
IV. CONCLUSION
Sufficient investigation into tobacco product placement is still necessary,
even years after the Justice Department announced its intention to act. If product
placement continues, the ramifications for Big Tobacco should be severe. In any
case, however, Hollywood bears some measure of responsibility for the continued
problem. Consequently, pressure for change must be applied directly to
Hollywood. The PSA approach has the potential to be tremendously useful in
reducing the impact of movie smoking on children. Hollywood cannot use its First
Amendment rhetoric to deflect calls for the PSA, because PSAs do not place limits
ucsf.edu/news/VermontNewsRelease.html (last visited July 5, 2005). These nine theaters, however,
were all independently owned. E-mail from Moira L. Cook, Tobacco Control Chief, Vermont
Department of Health, to Matthew Fuchs (Mar. 14, 2005, 20:48:03) (on file with the Journal of Health
Care Law & Policy). Those belonging to NATO declined to show the PSAs; when contacted, they
referred the Vermont Department of Health to the national office. Id. Vermont is currently organizing
another PSA campaign; Vermont's commissioner of health and attorney general have already agreed to
sign on to a letter strongly encouraging theaters to run trailers. Id. Despite the relatively small expense
of PSAs, given the general limitations on state budgets, states like Massachusetts and Vermont would
wholeheartedly welcome Hollywood's financial assistance.
240. Pechmann & Shih, supra note 228, at 11.
241. Id. at 10.
242. Id. Theaters may also be concerned because the amount of time they can devote to running
anything before a movie is finite; moviegoers will not stand for too much time taken away from the
feature film. E-mail from Marlene Trestman, supra note 40. In fact, in a lawsuit pending in the
Midwest, theater patrons claim they were deceived by a theater into believing a film would start at a
certain time, when instead they were forced to watch advertisements and trailers. Id.
243. Pechmann & Shih, supra note 228 at 10. (citing Lisa Unsworth (1997), Houston Herstak Favat
Advertising Agency (now part of Arnold Communication), personal communication, Boston, MA.)
244. Cornelia Pechmann et al., What to Convey in Antismoking Advertisements for Adolescents: The
Use of Protection Motivation Theory to Identify Effective Message Themes, 67 J. MARKETING 1, 11
(Apr., 2003), http://web.gsm.uci.edu/antismokingads/articles/trdrp3jm.pdf (last visited July 5, 2005).
245. Id. at 11-15. PSAs that emphasized adverse health effects, on the other hand, were ineffective
because of typical teenage notions of invincibility, e.g., immunity to disease. Id.
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on creative freedoms. Moreover, the PSA, in comparison to other options such as
the R rating, is feasible. It would therefore be wise for consumers to focus its calls
for change on the PSA approach.246 Although government leaders have been
thwarted in the past, they can still play a constructive role by publicizing the
problems caused by smoking in movies, thereby stoking consumer resentment
towards Hollywood. In addition, litigation may be a useful route to apply
Hollywood-directed pressure. The causes of action discussed here should be
explored and pursued.
246. Consumer pressure for PSAs is indispensable because the government is probably incapable of
compelling theaters to run PSAs through legal measures. This is true even though PSAs do not
implicate First Amendment concerns. The government could probably only attempt to require PSAs via
consumer protection laws. Most states have passed versions of consumer protection laws due to the
inadequacy of protection through common and federal law. See J.R. Franke & D.A. Ballam, New
Applications of Consumer Protection Law: Judicial Activism or Legislative Directive?, 32 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 347 (1992). To be subject to regulation by these laws, a practice or act must be unfair
or deceptive. Further, according to most laws, this deception must result in the failure to disclose a
material fact. NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., INC., SAMPLE SUMMARY OF STATE STATUTES,
http://www.consumerlaw.org/publications/manuals/content/samples/M5udap_814-817.pdf (last visited
July 5, 2005). However, Marlene Trestman, an Assistant Attorney General of Maryland, seriously
questions whether these laws could be construed to require PSAs. It would have to been shown that the
theater's deceit or misrepresentation is about a material fact leading to the purchase of the movie ticket
or sale of popcorn. E-mail from Marlene Trestman, supra note 40. "You'd have to argue that it was
unfair or deceptive ... because [the movie] didn't show harmful consequences [of smoking]. I don't
think that's [enough] to make a [consumer protection] case." Id.
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